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Abstract
Understanding the role of network structure in the evolution of cooperation is a key research goal at the intersection
between physics and biology. Recent studies have particularly focused on multiplex networks given that multiple
social domains are interrelated and cannot be represented by single-layer networks. However, the role of network
multiplexity is not fully understoodwhen combinedwith another important network characteristic: network dynamics.
In the present study, we investigated evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games played on dynamic two-layer multiplex
networks in which the payoff combined across the two layers determined strategy evolution. In addition, we introduced
network dynamics where agents can sever links with defecting neighbors and construct new links. Our simulation
showed that link updating enhances cooperation but the resultant states are far from those of full cooperation. This
modest enhancement in cooperation was related to symmetry breaking whereby the cooperation frequency in one
layer disproportionately increased while that in the other layer remained the same or even diminished. However,
this broken symmetry disappeared with sufficiently fast link updating. Our results show that the introduction of
network dynamics enhances cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma as previously reported, but this enhancement is
accompanied by significant asymmetry once network multiplexity is considered.
Introduction
The origin of cooperation is an intriguing research topic
at the intersection between physical and biological sci-
ences [1–5]; it has been analyzed using a mathematical
framework known as evolutionary game theory. The core
dilemma in the study of cooperation is the discrepancy
between myopic rationality and social efficiency. Specif-
ically, non-cooperators can avoid the costs of cooperation
while enjoying the benefits of others’ cooperation; thus,
non-cooperation is advantageous to individual interests.
Consequently, this free-riding leads to the prevalence of
non-cooperation and lower social efficiency.
Network reciprocity, where network structure supports
the maintenance of cooperation, offers one potential so-
lution to this dilemma. On the one hand, cooperators
cannot survive in well-mixed populations because defec-
tors can achieve larger payoffs on average by avoiding the
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cost of cooperation. On the other hand, a limited number
of neighbors interacting in a network facilitate the forma-
tion of cooperative clusters, which enable cooperators to
achieve higher fitness from the benefits of mutual coop-
eration. Since the seminal work of Nowak and May [6],
researchers have examined the effects of various network
characteristics, including degree heterogeneity [7, 8], av-
erage degree [9, 10], and assortativity [11], on coopera-
tion. One study has also clarified the relationship between
network reciprocity and a fundamental concept in evolu-
tionary biology, namely inclusive fitness [10].
In the present study, we focus on themultiplexity and dy-
namics of networks in relation to cooperation. Multilayer
networks that are not limited to multiplex networks are a
key research focus in network science [12]. Understanding
these types of network is crucial because multiple types
of (social) activity are interrelated and should therefore
be represented by networks with multiple layers. A sem-
inal study showed that failure in one layer (e.g., in power
1
networks) can lead to severe fragmentation in multiple
layers (e.g., in Internet networks as well as power net-
works) [13]. In addition, multiplex networks show novel
epidemic spreading patterns [14] and contribute to robust
diversity in culture formation models [15].
Multilayer networks are also vital to studying the evo-
lution of cooperation [16]. One widely examined in-
terdependency among network layers is payoff coupling
whereby individuals’ performances depend on the game
payoff frommultiple layers [17–22] and the existence of an
optimal interdependency level is indicated [23,24]. More
complex situations, in which the layers differed in the
games conducted [25–28] or topological characters [29],
have also been studied. In addition, network layers can
be coupled by other factors such as information about
strategy frequency [30], imitation probability [31], repu-
tation [32], social pressure [33], or the selection of im-
itation partners [34]. Furthermore, several studies have
demonstrated the coevolution of cooperation and interde-
pendency among network layers [35–39].
Multilayer networks have been found to support coop-
eration through incoherent behavior whereby individuals
adopt different strategies in different network layers; some
studies suggest that cooperation enhancement can be at-
tributed to this incoherent behavior rather than the con-
sistent adoption of cooperation in multiple layers of the
network [40, 41]. Moreover, such disparity over networks
appears not only at the individual level but also at the
macroscopic level; interdependent networks show sym-
metry breaking by which the overall cooperation levels in
each layer diverge. Thus, although the same rules may
be applied across the network, the extent of cooperation
enhancement can differ across layers [42–44].
Network dynamics is another realistic network charac-
teristic [45] that researchers have investigated in relation to
cooperation [46]. In evolutionary games, network dynam-
ics imply that the existence or duration of links between
individuals depends on the individuals’ attributes includ-
ing their strategy. Both theoretical [47–69] and experi-
mental [70–72] studies have demonstrated that network
dynamics strongly enhance cooperation; however, overly
fast link dynamics have been shown to hinder coopera-
tion [55,73]. Researchers have also indicated that network
dynamics are important to other types of cooperation-
related phenomena such as fairness [74–76]. Recently,
the role of network dynamics was elucidated further: suf-
ficiently fast link updating in a networkwas shown to result
in full cooperation in two-layer multiplex networks [77].
Although independent lines of research on multiplex
networks and network dynamics have provided valuable
insights into the role of networks in the evolution of coop-
eration, their coupled effects have yet to be fully examined
(a notable exception is Ref. [77]). To remedy this situation,
here we examined the prisoner’s dilemma game played on
dynamic multiplex networks. Specifically, agents were lo-
cated on networks with two layers (duplex networks) and
played the prisoner’s dilemma game with their neighbors.
The two layers were mutually related because the payoff
that accumulated over both layers determined the evolu-
tion of strategies. Links in each layer could be modified
depending on the strategy adopted by agents.
The results of our simulation showed that introducing
link updating to the network increased cooperation but
that the end result was far from full cooperation. The
modest enhancement in cooperation is related to symmetry
breaking whereby cooperation frequencies in one layer
increase while those in another layer decrease or remain
constant. However, we found that this broken symmetry
disappeared once the speed of link updating became overly
fast. In summary, our model shows that network dynamics
support cooperation but are accompanied by nontrivial
asymmetry once network multiplexity is considered.
Simulation model
We consider a duplex network in which each N agent oc-
cupies one node in both layers (please refer to Table 1 for
the overview of parameters in the model). Each agent will
participate in the prisoner’s dilemma game with her direct
neighbors (see Ref. [78] for the overview of dilemma sit-
uations). In each layer, agents adopt one of two strategies:
cooperation (C) or defection (D). Agent i’s strategy in
layer l is denoted by s
(l)
i . Through the interaction with
agent j on layer l, agent i acquires payoff pi
s
(l)
i s
(l)
j
. In the
prisoner’s dilemma, the order of the four payoff values is
piDC > piCC > piDD > piCD. Because defection results
in a larger payoff regardless of a partner’s decision, less
profitable mutual defection tends to be realized. Follow-
ing convention, we basically set the value of piCC (piDD)
to 1 (0) and controlled the harshness of social dilemmas
through the values of piDC and piCD. Because we as-
sume multiplex networks, all agents occupy one node in
each layer, and their overall payoff is determined by game
interactions in two layers as explained below.
In their initial states, agents are located on symmetri-
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Table 1 Overview of the parameters
Symbol Explanation Range
N Number of agents 1000 (but see Fig. 12)
p
Link generation probability of
Erdős-Rényi networks
0.01 (but see Fig. 12)
w Probability of link updating [0, 0.95]
µ Mutation probability 0.0001
piCC Payoff 1 (but see Fig. 13)
piCD Payoff
[-0.975, -0.025]
(but see Fig. 13)
piDC Payoff
[1.025, 1.975]
(but see Fig. 13)
piDD Payoff 0 (but see Fig. 13)
cal Erdős-Rényi random networks in which the two layers
share the same set of agents and edges. In other words,
the links between each pair of nodes on one layer are
generated with a probability of p as in the same manner
with one layer random networks; the other layer is a du-
plicate of this generated layer. One study [43] showed
that link overlap between network layers enhances coop-
eration. Because symmetrical initial states maximize link
overlap (and enhance cooperation), this initial state as-
sures the conservative estimate of the positive impact of
link updating on cooperation. Agents’ strategies in each
layer are randomly assigned; strategies in two layers may
not be consistent.
Two types of events modify this system: strategy up-
dating and link updating. In each round, one of these two
events occurs; link updating occurs with a probability of
w whereas strategy updating occurs with a probability of
1 − w. This parameter controls the speed of the network
dynamics relative to strategy evolution (please refer to Fig-
ure 1 for the schematic presentation of updating processes
in one elementary time step).
During strategy updating, agents may imitate their
neighbor’s strategy in a specific layer. In such an event,
one layer (λ) and one link in that layer (e
(λ)
i,j ) are randomly
selected; one of the connected agents is randomly selected
to become a focal agent, while the other becomes a role
agent [55, 79]. In the explanation provided here, agent i
becomes a focal agent while agent j becomes a role agent.
A study showed that this link-based rule suppresses coop-
eration than when determining a focal agent by the random
selection of one node from a whole population [79], and
we will examine how this rule works with multiplex net-
works.
In this study, we adopt simple network interdependency
and assume that agents’ payoffs are determined by the
interactions with all of their neighbors on both layers [40].
Formally, the focal agent’s payoff is determined as follows:
Πi =
∑
l∈{1,2}
∑
k∈N
(l)
i
pi
s
(l)
i s
(l)
k
/(z
(1)
i + z
(2)
i ), (1)
whereN
(l)
i is the set of the focal agent’s neighbors in layer
l. The accumulated payoff is regularized by the sum of
the agent’s degree in two layers (z
(1)
i + z
(2)
i ). The role
agent earns her payoff, Πj , in the same manner. Adopting
average payoffs means that achieving large degree (z
(1)
i +
z
(2)
i ) does not necessarily lead to higher fitness while the
difference in degree between two layers can influence the
behavior of agents through the different number of games
and their payoff. This point will be discussed in reporting
the simulation results.
The focal agent may imitate the role agent’s strategy
on layer λ when the role agent acquired larger payoff; the
imitation probability is given by Wu et al. [80] as follows:
P(s
(λ)
i ← s
(λ)
j ) = max {(Πj −Πi)/(piDC − piCD), 0} .
(2)
Here, payoff accumulation introduces interdependency be-
tween two layers but strategy transmission occurs only on
the selected layer.
3
Fig. 1 Schematic overview of the simulation process.
Strategy mutation occurs with a small probability (µ) in
strategy updating. Inmutations, the focal agent ignores the
results of the payoff-based imitation described above and
instead adopts one strategy randomly. Mutation causes
small perturbations in the system and prevents spurious
frozen states. These small perturbations are known to
have significant impacts on various types of model [81].
In link updating, cooperative agents may sever a link
with a defecting neighbor and form a new link. This
rule can be interpreted as cooperators punishing defecting
neighbors by cutting off social relationships. In this event,
one link, e
(λ)
i,j , is selected in the samemanner as in strategy
updating, and a focal agent (i in this example) is also
selected. Agent i severs the link with j when s
(λ)
i = C
and s
(λ)
j = D, and then rewires that link to a randomly
selected agent; nothing occurs in other combinations of
the agents’ strategy [55]. Because accepting a link with
a defecting agent does not improve the average payoff,
defecting agents cannot rewire their links.
We conducted Monte Carlo simulations to examine this
model. In these simulations, the relaxation process con-
tinued 4N × 104–2N × 106 periods; subsequently, the
sampling process continued 2N ×104–5N ×105 periods.
In order to enhance statistical accuracy, we conducted at
least ten simulation runs for each combination of param-
eters. We recorded the mean cooperation frequencies of
each layer (ρ
(1)
C and ρ
(2)
C ) in order to report simulation re-
sults. In addition, we recorded the absolute difference of
cooperation frequencies across two layers at each period
and calculated the average of these values (ρ∆C ).
Results and Discussions
The average cooperation frequencies in two layers (ρC =
(ρ
(1)
C + ρ
(2)
C )/2) are given as a function of the frequency
of link updating (w) to evaluate the overall cooperation
level (Figure 2). With many of the payoff value combina-
tions, the introduction of network dynamics has positive
impacts on cooperation. Where w is sufficiently large,
the system escapes from almost non-cooperative states.
The only exception to this positive impact of link updat-
ing is observed when payoff values are advantageous for
cooperators (piCD = −0.05 and piDC = 1.02).
Although network dynamics increase cooperation up to
a point, further increases in w result in decreasing coop-
eration levels, which has also been observed in one-layer
dynamic networks [55]. Furthermore, cooperation fre-
quency in the network is about 0.5 even with optimal
values of w. This result contrasts with another model
of games run on dynamic duplex networks in which full
cooperation was achieved with sufficiently fast link updat-
ing [77].
Symmetry breaking across two layers is related to the
modest cooperation enhancement shown in Figure 2. Fig-
4
(a) piCD = − 0.05
(c) piCD = − 0.5
(b) piCD = − 0.2
(d) piCD = − 0.8
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Fig. 2 Frequencies of cooperators (ρC ) are reported as a function
of the frequency of link updating (w). The introduction of
network dynamics (positive w) enhances cooperation in many
cases but full cooperation (ρC = 1) is not achieved. Further
increases in w decrease cooperation. Other parameters: N =
1000, p = 0.01, and µ = 10−4.
ure 3 shows the absolute difference in the cooperation
frequencies in two layers (ρ∆C ), which helps to assess if the
system shows symmetric behavior. The parameter values
in Figure 3 are the same as those in Figure 2. Two lay-
ers show similar cooperation frequencies with fixed edges
(w = 0) and this pattern holds as long as the values ofw re-
main small. Fixed networks also show asymmetric results
with some parameter values. Previous studies have also
reported symmetry breaking on static networks [42–44].
However, as Figure 3 shows, this result occurs only with
a limited combination of parameter values and the effects
are small compared to those observed with link updating.
With moderate values of w, the evolutionary process
leads to clear symmetry breaking across two layers. In
comparison to Figure 2, Figure 3 shows that this broken
symmetry is accompanied by an increase in ρC , which
demonstrates that cooperation enhancement is uneven
across two layers. Because the cooperation frequencies in
only one layer increase, the overall enhancement of coop-
eration is modest. Further increases in w, however, result
in restored symmetry that corresponds to the diminishing
cooperation frequencies shown in Figure 2.
We also examined the cooperation level in two lay-
ers separately to assess the evolutionary outcomes. Here
ρ
(max)
C and ρ
(min)
C denote the average frequency of cooper-
ators in a layer that showed higher and lower cooperation
frequencies at each period, respectively. Figure 4 shows
(a) piCD = − 0.05
(c) piCD = − 0.5
(b) piCD = − 0.2
(d) piCD = − 0.8
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Fig. 3 Absolute differences in the frequencies of cooperators
between the two layers (ρ∆C ) are reported. Moderate values ofw
induce symmetry breaking as indicated by positive ρ∆C . Please
refer to Figure 2 for the values of piDC . Other parameters:
N = 1000, p = 0.01, and µ = 10−4.
that one layer disproportionately enjoys the benefit of net-
work dynamics. Specifically, panel (a) shows that network
dynamics enhance cooperation in one layer at the expense
of diminishing cooperation levels in the other layer. This
result suggests that network dynamics destabilize the con-
sistent selection of cooperation across two layers. Ad-
ditionally, panel (b) shows that the introduction of link
updating leads to cooperation enhancement in only one
layer: cooperation frequencies in the other layer remain
almost zero.
Broken symmetry is observed with a wide range of
payoff values. In Figure 5, the value of w was set to 0.5
and the values of two payoff parameters, piCD and piDC ,
were varied. The upper panel shows that ρC is about 0.5
with large piCD and small piDC , whereas small values of
ρC are observed in the opposite scenario. Between these
two scenarios, moderate values of ρC are observed, and
this region corresponds to large ρ∆C , as shown in the lower
panel.
We can observe similar patterns with different values of
w in Figure 6. When disadvantage for cooperation is small
(i.e., larger piCD), ρ
∆
C reaches the peak with moderate
values of piDC . In contrast, as the dilemma harshness
increases (i.e., smaller piCD), ρ
∆
C decreases monotonically
with ρC . Though payoff values where ρ
∆
C shows (non-
)monotonic patterns depend on the values ofw, qualitative
patterns are similar regardless of the values of w.
In addition, we observed positive impacts of link updat-
ing. Though exceptions were observed with soft-dilemma
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(a) piCD = − 0.2, piDC = 1.02 (b) piCD = − 0.2, piDC = 1.42
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Fig. 4 Cooperation frequencies in two layers are reported sep-
arately. ρ
(max)
C and ρ
(min)
C denote the average frequency of
cooperators in a layer that showed higher and lower cooperation
frequencies at each period. Link updating (w > 0) increases
cooperation in one layer while cooperation levels in another
layer decrease (panel (a)) or remain the same (panel (b)). Other
parameters: N = 1000, p = 0.01, and µ = 10−4.
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Fig. 5 ρC and ρ
∆
C are reported as a function of two payoff pa-
rameters. Lower panel shows broken symmetry (large ρ∆C )
with a wide range of parameters for which a moderate coop-
eration level is achieved in upper panel. Other parameters:
N = 1000, p = 0.01, w = 0.5, and µ = 10−4.
(a1) w = 0.2
(b1) w = 0.4
(c1) w = 0.8
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(c2) w = 0.8
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Fig. 6 ρC (panels (a1)–(c1)) and ρ
∆
C (panels (a2)–(c2)) are re-
ported for different values of w and two payoff parameters.
ρ∆C shows non-monotonic patterns with large piCD (such as
−0.02). In contrast, ρC and ρ∆C decrease monotonically when
dilemma strength is large (small piCD). Other parameters:
N = 1000, p = 0.01, and µ = 10−4.
6
(a) piCD = − 0.02
(c) piCD = − 0.52
(b) piCD = − 0.27
(d) piCD = − 0.77
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Fig. 7 Strategy selection across two layers is reported. Coherent
selection of defection emergeswith harsh dilemmas as observed
with the large values of ρDD . In contrast, cooperation survival
depends on incoherent behavior as indicated by the large (small)
values of ρCD (ρCC). Other parameters: N = 1000, p =
0.01, w = 0.5 and µ = 10−4.
situations, fast-link updating supports the survival of co-
operation, especially with a harsh social dilemma (small
piCD and large piDC). This pattern is consistent with the
view that link updating serves as a game-exit option. No-
tably, this cooperation survival accompanies positive val-
ues of ρ∆C , which means that network layers do not show
symmetrically enhance cooperation.
To further understand this asymmetric state, we exam-
ined the strategy correlation between two layers in Figure
7. The value of w is set to 0.5 as in Figure 5. The values
of ρCC , ρCD, and ρDD show the frequencies of agents
who adopt cooperation on both, either, or neither layers,
respectively. The figure shows that both layers reach non-
cooperation with sufficiently harsh dilemma; the value
of ρDD approaches one with sufficiently large piDC /small
piCD. In contrast, coherent cooperation in both layers is
hardly realized. Although ρCC takes positive values with
relatively weak dilemma situations, larger frequencies of
ρCD suggests that cooperation survival can be primarily
attributed to the incoherent behavior across two network
layers.
To investigate how the system reaches this asymmetrical
state, the time evolution of the values of ρCC , ρCD, and
ρDD was assessed and is shown in Figure 8. Without link
updating (w = 0), the characteristic pattern observed in
evolutionary games on networks is also observed in our
model (panel (a)). Cooperation frequency increases due
to the formation of cooperative clusters after the initial
(a) w = 0 (b) w = 0.1 (c) w = 0.1
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0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
round / N
Pr
op
or
tio
n
ρCC
ρDD
ρCD
Fig. 8 Time evolution of strategy selection across two layers is
reported. Though coherent selection of cooperation (large ρCC)
is observed with w = 0 (panel (a)), this behavior vanishes once
a link-updating event is introduced (w = 0.1; panel (b)). This
pattern is observedwith different initial cooperation frequencies
(w = 0.1; panel (c)). Other parameters: N = 1000, p =
0.01, µ = 10−4, piCD = −0.2, and piDC = 1.02.
enduring periods [82, 83]. This pattern is observed with
the values of ρCC and ρCD, which indicate that both layers
enjoy the benefit of network reciprocity.
As shown in Figure 8, the adoption of cooperation in
both layers cannot produce stable outcomes with link up-
dating (panel (b)); the value of ρCC decreases after reach-
ing its peak. This pattern can be attributed to agents
achieving a large average payoff if they achieve mutual co-
operation in one layer. Although defection in another layer
leads to the loss of links with cooperators, interactions in
a cooperative layer mainly determine the average payoff
as long as degree in that layer is sufficiently larger than
degree in a low-cooperation layer. In a previous study that
demonstrated full cooperation with fast link updating [77],
agents accumulate payoffs from game interactions in two
network layers; thus, selecting cooperation and achieving
large degree size in both layers contribute to acquiring
a large payoff. We surmise that this difference in the
payoff-collecting mechanism contributes to the different
evolutionary outcomes observed.
The instability of cooperation in both layers can also
be investigated using simulation runs with different initial
cooperation frequencies. In panel (c) where the initial
frequency of cooperation in each layer is 0.9, the frequency
of agents who select cooperation on both layers diminishes
and asymmetric behavior occupies the population.
To further understand the time evolution of the system,
Figure 9 shows the cooperation level of the two layers
in one simulation run. Panel (a) reveals that one layer
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(a) w = 0.1 (b) w = 0.55
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Fig. 9 Time evolution of cooperation frequencies in two layers
is reported separately. Each panel shows the result of one
simulation run. One layer shows stably higher cooperation
levels with smallerw (panel (a)) but largerw leads to alternation
of cooperative layers (panel (b)). Other parameters: N =
1000, p = 0.01, µ = 10−4, piCD = −0.2, and piDC = 1.02.
stably shows higher cooperation frequencies with w =
0.1, which suggests that positive values of ρ∆C indicate
long-run disparity in cooperation levels between two layers
(see the results in panel (b) of Figure 3 which adopts the
same parameter values). In contrast, fast link updating
(w = 0.55) leads to alternation of cooperative layers that
betokens the restored symmetry with further large w.
To investigate how the system reaches this asymmet-
rical state, we examined the relationship between the
nodes’ degree and strategy. As shown in Figure 10,
we detected one layer whose cooperation was higher at
t = 15000N ; we then reported the cooperation frequen-
cies of the high-cooperation layer (panel (a)) and a low-
cooperation layer (panel (b)) as a function of the degree
in the high-cooperation layer. A stylized fact of games on
heterogeneous networks, including dynamic networks, is
that nodes with a larger degree tend to be cooperative [8].
We also confirmed this pattern in our simulations: we
observed a positive correlation between cooperation and
degree in the high-cooperation layer (panel (a)). There-
fore, agents keep choosing cooperation as long as they
achieve large degree.
In contrast, we observed U-shaped relationships be-
tween the cooperation frequency in the low-cooperation
layer and the degree in the high-cooperation layer (panel
(b)). Therefore, cooperators can apparently survive in
the low-cooperation layer in two scenarios. First, free-
riders who gain a large payoff in the high-cooperation
layer can continue to choose cooperation in the low-
cooperation layer. This explains the higher cooperation
frequency observed among agents whose degree in the
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t = 1000N
t = 5000N
t = 7500N
t = 15000N
Fig. 10 Frequencies of cooperators are reported as a function of
degree in the layer that achieves a higher cooperation level at
t = 15000N . Panel (a) shows that the frequency of cooperators
in the high-cooperation layer is positively correlatedwith degree
of that layer. In contrast, panel (b) shows that the frequency of
cooperators in the low-cooperation layer and degree in the high-
cooperation layer show U-shaped relationships. Other parame-
ters: N = 1000, p = 0.01, w = 0.1, µ = 10−4, piCD = −0.2,
and piDC = 1.02.
high-cooperation layer was small (a small degree suggests
that the agents chose defection). Second, agents with a
large degree in the high-cooperation layer can remain co-
operative because interactions in the low-cooperation layer
have a small impact on payoff. Although the cooperation
frequency of the groups with the largest degree is noisy
due to the small number of observations, these scenarios
help to explain the observed relationships. This pattern
holds until the cooperation level on the low-cooperation
layer approaches zero.
Next, we conducted additional simulations and investi-
gated the resultant network characteristics in addition to
strategy frequencies. Figure 11 reposts cooperation fre-
quencies (panels (a1)–(d1)), degree variance normalized
by average degree (panels (a2)–(d2)), and cluster coeffi-
cients (panels (a3)–(d3)). Two values in the figure, max
and min, correspond to the values of a layer that achieves
large and small cooperation frequency, respectively. With
low dilemma harshness (piCD = −0.05 and piDC = 1.02;
panels (a)), cooperation frequencies diverge with small
w. Two layers show similar levels of degree variance
and cluster coefficients in these cases, and asymmetry in
cooperation does not accompany asymmetrical networks.
In contrast, a combination of a harsh dilemma and fast
link updating induces different cooperation levels and net-
work characteristics. Panels (b)–(d) show that a layer with
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Fig. 11 Cooperation frequencies (panels (a1–d1)), degree variance (panels (a2–d2)), and cluster coefficients (panels (a3–d3))
are reported as a function of the frequency of link updating for different payoff values. Two reported values, max and min,
correspond to the values of a layer that achieves large and small cooperation frequency. Discrepancies in cooperation levels do
not accompany asymmetrical networks with soft dilemmas and slow link updating (panels (a)). In contrast, harsh dilemmas and
fast link updating induce symmetry breaking in the network topology as well as the cooperation levels (panels (b)–(d)). Other
parameters: N = 1000, p = 0.01 and µ = 10−4.
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Fig. 12 ρ∆C is reported with different system sizes. Qualitative
patterns in Figure 3 are replicated with different system sizes.
Value of p is 0.04 and 0.0005 with N = 250 and N = 20000,
respectively. Other parameters: µ = 10−4.
higher cooperation levels indicates larger degree variance
and cluster coefficients. Previous studies have shown that
degree heterogeneity and clustering contributes to the evo-
lution of cooperation [3]. The difference in network topol-
ogy between two layers agrees with this observation.
In the rest of this article, we conducted some robustness
checks. First, we conducted simulations using a larger
(N = 20000) or smaller (N = 250) network size. Figure
12 shows ρ∆C as a function ofw in the samemanner as Fig-
ure 3. As already shown in our network with N = 1000,
we confirmed that the system shows symmetry breaking
with moderate values of w in different sized networks.
Next, we used different payoff values because the
value of piCC (piDD) was set to 1 (0) in the simula-
tion so far. Here, we introduce the framework called
universal scaling for the dilemma strength proposed in
Ref. [84–86]. In this framework, harshness of the so-
cial dilemma is mainly controlled by two parameters D′g
and D′r , where D
′
g = (piDC − piCC)/(piCC − piDD) and
D′r = (piDD − piCD)/(piCC − piDD). Larger values of
these two parameters indicate harsher dilemma. Payoff
values are represented as piDC = piCC+(piCC−piDD)D
′
g
and piCD = piDD − (piCC − piDD)D
′
r using this frame-
work. The merit of this framework is that the evolutionary
outcomes do not depend on the size of piCC − piDD.
Figure 13 shows ρC and ρ
∆
C with different values of piCC
and piDD. The figure shows that both ρC and ρ
∆
C do not
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Fig. 13 ρC (panels (a1)–(d1)) and ρ
∆
C (panels (a2)–(d2)) are
examined using the framework of universal scaling for the
dilemma strength. Outcomes are controlled by D′g and D
′
r,
and the values of piCC and piDD have negligible effects. Other
parameters: N = 1000, p = 0.01, w = 0.5 and µ = 10−4.
depend on the values of piCC and piDD. This pattern shows
that our findings can be applied with wider range of payoff
values. In addition, the result corroborates the validity
of the framework of universal scaling in more complex
situations, i.e., dynamic multiplex networks.
Finally, we examined whether the observed patterns de-
pend on the structure of initial networks. In addition to
Erdős-Rényi networks, we considered expanded cycle, and
Barabási-Albert networks [87]. In generating expanded
cycles, agents were arranged in a circle, and each agent
was connected to d/2 neighbors on both sides. In gener-
ating Barabási-Albert networks, a complete network with
m0 agentswas generated; the restN−m0 agentswere con-
nected with m agents following a preferential attachment
rule. In the initial states, the two layers were identical:
one layer was generated and the other layer was a copy of
that generated layer. Figure 14 reports the ρ∆C with dif-
ferent initial network topology. Naturally, networks with
different initial topology can result in different outcomes
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Fig. 14 ρ∆C is examined with different initial networks. Al-
though different network topology affects evolutionary out-
comes with fixed networks (e.g., panel (a)), this effect dissi-
pates when network structure coevolves with strategy (w > 0).
In generating Erdős-Rényi, expanded cycle, and Barabási-
Albert networks, we adopted the parameter values p = 0.01,
d = 10, and m0 = m = 5, respectively. Other parameters:
N = 1000, w = 0.5 and µ = 10−4.
without link updating (w = 0, see panel (a)). However,
once link updating is introduced (w > 0), evolutionary
outcomes show similar qualitative patterns regardless of
initial networks. This result suggests that the evolution
of network topology induced by strategy-based link up-
dating removes the dependency of strategy adoption on
initial networks.
Conclusion
Here, we evaluated the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma
game played on a dynamic duplex network. The intro-
duction of network dynamics led to enhanced cooperation
but the resultant states were far from those of full coop-
eration. The pattern we observed was related to broken
symmetry, whereby link updating led to enhanced cooper-
ation in one layer while cooperation frequencies in another
layer remained the same or deteriorated. This state was
maintained as long as the frequency of link updating was
not overly high. The robust findings of previous studies
have demonstrated that network dynamics facilitate coop-
eration [46]. Our results show that the ramifications of
link updating become more nuanced once network multi-
plexity is considered.
Lastly, we consider the potential future extensions of
this study. Our simulation results suggest that individu-
als can show incoherent behavior across multiple social
domains: they may choose cooperation in one domain
but choose a defecting option in another domain. Future
studies could therefore examine under which conditions
individuals tend to show (in)coherent behavior in multiple
social domains. For example, the present study evalu-
ated average payoff but additional studies might also con-
sider accumulated payoff and a combination of the two
methods [88]. Furthermore, although our study relies on
imitation-based evolution (which to date has been widely
adopted), other studies have indicated that the strategy-
updating rule has a significant role in the evolution of
cooperation [89]. Studies in these areas may further con-
tribute to our understanding of the conditions under which
networkmultiplexity and network dynamics affect the evo-
lution of cooperation.
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